In a recent New York Times article in the opinion section, Jason Horowitz discussed the concept of ‘Finlandization’, a term that has come up over and over in current political discourse about how to resolve the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The header reads: “Finns don’t wish ‘Finlandization’ on Ukraine (or Anyone)”. Recounting the reasons for why this term still makes many Finns uncomfortable – notably because of its association with a time where Finland was forced to make concessions to the Soviet Union – he provides an accurate account of its meaning in Finnish foreign policy circles as well as among the population. My goal in this article, however, is to go a bit more into what ‘finlandization’ exactly is, how this terminology emerged and how it is used to refer to a potential solution to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
As Horowitz rightly pointed out, the academic use of the term ‘finlandization’ first emerged in German political science, and entered diplomatic language in the 1970s. Often the German political scientist Richard Löwenthal is being cited as the first person to use the term starting in the 1960s to describe the influence of the Soviet Union on Finland’s foreign policy (Forsberg and Pesu 2016: 475). The eminent political scientist Wichard Woyke (1977) included ‘finlandization’ in his German language handbook on international politics with the following definition: “Finland’s unique type of neutrality – which is used by Western politicians, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, as dependent on the whims (or mercy) of the Soviet Union. Finlandization refers to a process, whereby a country or a region, is steered into this apparent type of dependent neutrality” (p. 111-112). Using this definition it becomes easier to see, where the negative connotation of ‘finlandization’ emerged, because it suggests that the country in question is not “truly neutral” and therefore not fully independent in terms of foreign policy.
According to Hanna Rieck (2010) the pejorative character of the term became especially apparent in the year 1970, when the party leader of the German Christian Social Union (CSU) – the Bavarian sister party of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) – Franz-Josef Strauß used the term to insinuate that the social-liberal government at the time was willing to take Germany down a path of ‘finlandization’ for being too friendly towards the Soviet Union. Understandably, Strauss’ statement was followed by heavy criticism from the Finnish press, who argued that it tarnished their good name (p. 224).
Since there were numerous speculations about the possibility of Ukraine dropping its commitment to joining NATO at the time of this writing, it seems evident that some foreign policy experts are considering this type of ‘finlandization’ an option. One prominent example is Anatol Lieven, who wrote an article in January proposing neutrality as a ‘golden bridge’ to deescalate the situation between Russia and Ukraine. He claims ‘the West’ has no strategic interest in fighting a war against Russia over Ukraine, which is why he believes neutrality is the best option for peace. Criticizing what he calls “the pejorative condemnation of ‘Finlandization’” fails to account for the fact that “the Soviet-Finnish treaty of 1948 establishing Finnish neutrality in the Cold War also ruled out Communist rule in Finland, allowed Finland to develop as a successful free-market democracy”.
As Lieven brings up the Soviet-Finnish treaty, I found it necessary to revisit some of its provisions. After agreeing to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union in 1948, Finland declined the Western invitation to join the American Marshall Plan, losing out on substantial levels of financial aid in order to avoid arousing the suspicion of the Soviets (Palosaari 2013: 360). Among other things the FCMA Treaty enshrined Finland’s desire to stay outside great power politics, while at the same time containing a clause which promised Soviet assistance in case Finland was attacked by a foreign power (Ibid.). Substantially, the FCMA Treaty became a kind of corset that not only severely restricted Finland’s foreign and military policy – with the notable exception of UN peacekeeping initiatives as well as mediation – but also meant that Finland was unable to cooperate or associate with NATO before the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
So what is to follow from all this? I don’t claim to have the answer, but as I argued from the beginning: My main goal was to look into the use of the word ‘finlandization’, discuss how this terminology emerged and give some examples of how it is used in foreign policy discourse today. Whether or not Ukraine will pursue a strategy of this type will be up to President Zelensky and Ukrainian diplomats.
Sources:
- Finnish-Sowjetischer Vertrag von 1948. DBpedia. https://dbpedia.org/page/Finno-Soviet_Treaty_of_1948
- Forsberg, T., & Pesu, M. (2016). The “Finlandisation” of Finland: The ideal type, the historical model, and the lessons learnt. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 27(3), 473-495.
- Lieven A. (2022) Ukrainian neutrality: a ‘golden bridge’ out of the current geopolitical trap. Responsible Statecraft. 03.01.2022. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/01/03/ukrainian-neutrality-golden-bridge-out-of-a-current-geopolitical-trap/
- Hietaparta. Pixabay. https://pixabay.com/photos/finnish-flag-blue-cross-flag-201175/
- Palosaari, T. (2013). Still a Physician rather than a Judge? The Post‐Cold War Foreign and Security Policy of Finland. Swiss Political Science Review, 19(3), 357-375.
- Rieck, Hanna (2010). Das “nordische Finnland”: Touristischer und kultureller Blick aus der Bundesrepublik. in: Schweitzer, Robert (Hrsg.). Zweihundert Jahre deutsche Finnlandbegeisterung. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, page 224.
- Saviliev, David. https://www.rees.ox.ac.uk/people/david-saveliev. @Savieliev_David https://twitter.com/Saveliev_David
- Woyke W. (1977) Finnlandisierung. In: Woyke W. (eds) Handwörterbuch Internationale Politik. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-85711-8_22
Richard Skalt 
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